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Abstract—Most keystroke dynamics studies have been eval-
uated using a specific kind of dataset in which users type
an imposed login and password. Moreover, these studies are
optimistics since most of them use different acquisition protocols,
private datasets, controlled environment, etc. In order to enhance
the accuracy of keystroke dynamics’ performance, the main
contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we provide a new
kind of dataset in which users have typed both an imposed
and a chosen pairs of logins and passwords. In addition, the
keystroke dynamics samples are collected in a web-based uncon-
trolled environment (OS, keyboards, browser, etc.). Such kind of
dataset is important since it provides us more realistic results of
keystroke dynamics’ performance in comparison to the literature
(controlled environment, etc.). Second, we present a statistical
analysis of well known assertions such as the relationship between
performance and password size, impact of fusion schemes on
system overall performance, and others such as the relationship
between performance and entropy. We put into obviousness in
this paper some new results on keystroke dynamics in realistic
conditions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Keystroke dynamics allows users to be recognized based
on their way of typing on a keyboard. This is a behavioral
modality which has been first experimented in the eighties [3].
It is always an interesting subject of research, as it is a low
cost two factors authentication approach. Most consequent
keystroke dynamics studies have been evaluated on datasets
where users typed the same fixed string [11], [4], [1], while
very few of them used different strings for each users [2], [9].
For this study, we want to be placed in the following context.
We want to use a web-based application with an authentication
system based on static keystroke dynamics. Some studies have
already been done on web-based keystroke dynamics [14], [2],
[13], [10], but none of them provided the used dataset and their
experimental protocols were really differents. Some worked
with individual passwords [10], while other used the same
strings for each user [14]. In our work, we statistically analyze
the behavior of these two approaches.
There is a strong need of a large dataset. We provide a new
dataset where users typed both an imposed pair of login and
password, a chosen login (their usual one) and password (one
chosen by themselves for the experiment). The aim of the
dataset is to show the viability of using personal identifiers
(i.e., chosen login and password) in native web browser (i.e.,
using no plug-in or extension of the web browser), because
the most recent applications are web-based ones, and systems
usually use different logins and passwords for each user. The
contribution of this paper is to present this new dataset that
is publicly available1 for testing algorithms in an operational
context and experiment keystroke dynamics on this dataset.
It is the sole public dataset which satisfy these properties.
Additionally, we analyze information provided in this dataset
to answer operational questions such as those presented in
section III, part B. The paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents existing public datasets and the dataset built for
the experiment. Section III presents the various experiments.
Section IV presents their results. Section V concludes this
paper and gives some perspectives.
II. PUBLIC KEYSTROKE DYNAMICS DATASETS
In most studies, researchers use their own dataset which,
most of the time, suffers of lack of number of users and
sessions. Some keystroke dynamics databases are publicly
available in the literature, but none of them provides different
login and password for each user. In [4], several users have
typed the passphrase “greyc laboratory” on two different
keyboards on the same computer during several sessions. 100
users have provided at least 60 samples each on 5 different
sessions spaced of one week (most of the time). This database
contains the most number of users, but, the number of samples
and sessions may be too small to track variability through time.
In [11], several users have typed the password “.tie5Roanl”
on a single computer during several sessions. 51 users have
provided 400 samples each on 8 different sessions spaced
of, at least, one day. This database contains a huge number
of samples, but the time interval may be too small to track
variability on a long period. These two databases are the only
ones containing enough samples and users to give statistically
significant results. Sadly, they mainly have been used by their
own creators, and not by the community. Table I summarizes
this information. Even if these two databases are interesting,
they do not really fit requirements for realistic studies:
1) We want different logins and passwords per user. This is
the most realistic scenario for keystroke dynamics. Real
users use different logins and passwords.
1http://www.epaymentbiometrics.ensicaen.fr/
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2) It is interesting to have different computers and key-
boards to grow the variability of the samples (due
to shape of keyboard, responsiveness of the computer,
precision of the timer, . . . ).
3) The captures must have been done in a web browser
(because nowadays, most of modern applications are
available as web-based applications, and not desktop
applications. Collecting samples from different browsers
allows to track more variability due the browser itself
(several browsers exist on all the operating systems).
We have created a web-based application which allows
us to capture keystroke dynamics during several sessions.
We think that with this dataset, researchers will have an
interesting dataset providing a lot of variabilities due to the
different factors presented before. The results would not be
over optimistic as it may be the case with actual ones. The
next section presents the experiment.
III. EXPERIMENT
A. Proposed Dataset
1) Acquisition Protocol: Each week, we have sent an
email to the students of our school of engineering and some
colleagues of our lab. It asks them to realize the session
capture of the week. The first one explains the aim of their
participation. During the first session, each user has to choose
its own login (we asked them to use the login of their school
account, but they have not all respected that), and password.
We expect them to type their login as they are used to. So, each
user chooses when he/she wants to do the session without any
obligation or pressure. Participants have not been rewarded. A
session is composed of three different steps. Each step consists
in typing several times a pair of login and password. The user
interface presents two input fields: one for the login, and one
for the password. No typing correction is allowed: if a user
presses backspace, the input field is cleared, and the user must
type its text from scratch. The password and login the user
have to type are displayed near the form and are displayed in
a pop-up box at the start of each step2.
A progression bar is shown at the bottom of the screen.
It indicates how many inputs are yet needed to complete
the session. As the interface is displayed in a web browser,
it is written with Javascript, html and css. Most studies of
keystroke dynamics which work on a web browser are written
in Java [14], [2], [13]. We have not chosen this language
because it imposes the user to install a Java plugin for its
browser. For each key event (key press and key release), the
timing information is captured through the timeStamp value
of the event3. We do not track timing information of the key
having a code inferior to 48 (except tab, shift, space, ctrl, altgr,
and keycode 0 which seems to be present for some punctuated
keys) as all as right and left Windows key and keys from F1
to F12. The three acquisition steps are the following ones:
2No screenshots for lack of space
3https://developer.mozilla.org/En/DOM/Event.timeStamp
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF THE KEYSTROKE DYNAMICS DATABASES. PROP. REFERS TO
THE PROPOSED DATASET. SAME MEANS EACH USER TYPES THE SAME
PASSWORD (SO IMPOSTOR ARE USED TO TYPE THE SAME PASSWORD
THAN THE USER), WHILE DIFFERENT MEANS EACH USER TYPES A
DIFFERENT PASSWORD (AND IMPOSTORS ARE NOT USED TO TYPE IT).
Size Login/password
Study # users # samples same different
[4] 100 60000 X
[11] 51 20400 X
Prop. 83 5185 +
5754/5439
X X
• Step 1. Ten inputs of a pair of imposed login and
password. This allows us to capture exactly the same
thing for all the users as in [4], [11].
• Step 2. Ten inputs of the chosen pair of login and
password of the user. This simulates the authentication
of the user on a system as in [9], [15].
• Step 3. For two other users, five inputs of the selected
pair of login and password. This allows us to capture ten
impostor samples belonging to two other users.
2) Presentation of the Obtained Dataset: As the participa-
tion was only based on the goodwill of the users, very few
of them participated to the study or to each session. That is
why only 83 users have participated to the study, whereas the
emails were sent to more than 300 students. Sessions were not
always done completely. Users have provided a total of 5185
genuine samples (pair of login, password typed by its owner),
5754 impostor samples (pair of login, password typed by a
user different of its owner), and 5439 imposed samples (pair of
imposed login and password). Most participants are between
20 and 24 years old (mainly students in computer science,
chemistry and electronics). Most users are males, which can
be problematic to generalize results if males and females have
different typing behaviors [6]. Most users have more than 20
impostor samples which allows to obtain good information
on False Match Rate. The number of genuine and imposed
samples per user is not equally set, there are several users
who have provided less than 40 genuine samples. It is difficult
to obtain a large keystroke dynamics database with enough
quantity of samples per user (which may explain why there
are so few publicly available keystroke dynamics databases,
and why, most of the time the number of users is relatively
small).
Although the obtained dataset is not the largest in terms
of number of users involved, it is the only public keystroke
dynamics providing different logins and passwords per users.
Thus, it is the more realistic one.
B. Experimental Protocol
We want to answer to the following questions:
1) Does keystroke dynamics’ performance behaves simi-
larly on a dataset built with imposed strings, against a
dataset built with strings chosen by users themselves?
This question is interesting because all public datasets
do use imposed strings.
2) Which approach (individual or global threshold) gives
better results in terms of performance? This question
is interesting, because both approaches are used in the
literature and avoid an easy performance comparison.
3) Which features must be used in a score fusion system,
in order to improve results?
4) Are password length, entropy and complexity correlated
with the recognition performance? This question is in-
teresting, because it has not been studied in the literature
(probably because all the passwords are identical). It can
give information of how the password must or must not
be chosen by the user, in order to strengthen the system.
We have run several experiments using the different subsets
(chosen/imposed) to analyze the performance of keystroke
dynamics authentication methods. The Equal Error Rate (EER)
is individually computed for each user (i.e., EER is computed
with the comparison scores of its test samples against its
model and real impostors’ test samples against its model),
and, its averaged value (among all users) is presented under
EERi. EERg presents the EER with the same threshold for
all the users (EER is computed with a global intra-scores and
inter-scores set). These are two common ways of presenting
keystroke dynamics results, but no study analyzed the perfor-
mance difference between the two approaches. Authentication
test is done with only one capture, we do not give another
chance if it fails (several tries is a another common way of
presenting results [9], [12]). Training is done with 20 samples
(two sessions), and testing is done with the remaining samples.
We only keep users having at least 20 testing samples (at least
two sessions per user). So, we work with users having used the
system during at least 4 sessions. As users may use different
keys for typing their login or password, the number of pressed
characters may be different.
1) Distance Computation: In this paper, we have tested
only one score computing method. It is based on a Gaussian
distribution assumption of the features [8]. Each user provides
N samples to build its template. A sample x is a n-dimension
vector. The template θ = (µ,σ) is composed of the mean
vector µ and the standard deviation vector σ among these
features. The distance between sample x and template θ is
computed using the following formulation:
d(x,θ) = 1− 1
n
n∑
i
exp
(
−|xi − µi|
σi
)
(1)
If a query is not of the same size (different combinations of
keys, or use of the mouse to select and erase text, can be the
reason of this difference) of the template, we return a distance
of 1 (the worst score, 0 being the best).
2) Statistical Validation: In order to verify the various
answers, we use the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) test [7]. It is a
non-parametric (distribution free) test, which is used to decide
whether K independent samples are from the same population.
More generally speaking, it is used to test two hypothesis: the
null hypothesis (H0 : µ1 = µ2 = ... = µk) assumes that
samples have been generated from the same population (i.e.,
equal population means) against the alternative hypothesis
(H1 : µi 6= µj) which assumes that there is a statistically
significant difference between at least two of the subgroups.
The decision criterion is then derived from the estimated
p− value as depicted in equation 2.{
p− value ≥ 0.05 accept H0
otherwise reject H0
(2)
3) Simple Feature Authentication: We test several features:
“rp” (latency between the release of a key, and the pressure of
next one), “rr” (latency between the release of two successive
keys), “pp” (latency between the pressure of two successive
keys) and “pr” (duration of pressure of one key) for both
login and password individually, and for each kind of datasets
(imposed login/password and chosen login/password). This
gives us 4 ∗ 2 ∗ 2 = 164 different experiments.
4) Score Fusion: Although feature fusion is often used in
keystroke dynamics [5], [1], [11], we have chosen to use a
score fusion system [16], [8]. A user sample is composed
of several sub-samples (one per kind of extracted features):
x = (xlrr,x
l
rp,x
l
pr,x
l
pp,x
p
rr,x
p
rp,x
p
pr,x
p
pp) (superscript l and
p respectively represent login and password). A template
is built for each kind of sample extracted features: θ =
(θlrr,θ
l
rp,θ
l
pr,θ
l
pp,θ
p
rr,θ
p
rp,θ
p
pr,θ
p
pp). In this case, the same
keystroke dynamics method is used for each extracted features.
The final score is the mean (without score normalization) of
each of these scores (one for each selected feature), so the
fusion rule is: sf = 1m
∑m
i si with sf the new fused score,
and si the comparison score of system i (using features of
type i), when using m different systems. As an illustration,
figure 1 presents the score fusion architecture when pp and rp
times from login and password are used.
5) Study of the performance depending on password size
and complexity: For this experiment, we use the score fusion
of all the features of the password. We would like to verify if
keystroke dynamics’ performance depends on the complexity,
the size, or the entropy of the password. Towards this goal, we
use again the KW test. For the complexity computation, we
have used an existing algorithm which is often used in web
applications as depicted in figure 2. The entropy quantifies the
expected value of the information contained in the password
p. The password contains P unique characters {c1, · · · , cP }.
p(ci) is the probability of appearance of the character ci in
the password P. Entropy is computed as following:
H(P) = −
P∑
i=1
p(ci) log2(ci) (3)
IV. RESULTS
In this section, we present the results of the experiments
previously presented. Even if the number of users in the dataset
is quite important, only 48 of them provided enough samples
to be used in the experiments (note that most of keystroke
dynamics studies even use fewer individuals).
4number of features * login or password * imposed or chosen
Fig. 1. Score fusion scheme using only RR and RP features.
Require: PASSWORD
SIZE ← number of char of PASSWORD
LOW , UPP , NUM , OTH ← (0, 0, 0, 0)
for i = 1 to SIZE do
CHAR ← PASSWORD[i]
if CHAR ≥ ’a’ and CHAR ≤ ’z’ then
SCORE ← SCORE + 1
LOW ← 1
else if CHAR ≥ ’A’ and CHAR ≤ ’Z’ then
SCORE ← SCORE + 2
UPP ← 2
else if CHAR ≥ ’0’ and CHAR ≤ ’9’ then
SCORE ← SCORE + 3
NUM ← 3
else
SCORE ← SCORE + 5
OTH ← 5
end if
end for
COEFF ← SCORE/SIZE
DIV ERSITY ← LOW + UPP +NUM +OTH
return COEFF ∗DIV ERSITY ∗ SIZE
Fig. 2. Compute the complexity of a password (in terme of password security
and not typing difficulty).
A. Simple Feature Authentication
Table II presents the results of the simple feature authenti-
cation experiments. Using the KW test, we find that there is
no significant difference (p − value = 0.68) of performance
between the chosen and the imposed datasets. This was a
surprising result since users are more likely to type their
own login and password than an imposed ones. We may
obtain these results because, even if users have chosen their
password, it is not their real password they type several times
per day. Using the chosen and imposed datasets, we found
that the performance of individual approach outperformed
(p− value << 0.05) the global approach.
Using both datasets, we found that the login outperformed
TABLE II
AUTHENTICATION RESULTS, FOR DIFFERENT EXTRACTED FEATURES FOR
EACH KIND OF TEXT. THE BEST RESULT OF EACH LINE IS IN BOLD. THE
BEST RESULT OF EACH COLUMN IS UNDERLINED.
Chosen dataset Imposed dataset
Type Field EERi EERg EERi EERg
pr login 26.50% 28.81% 19.79% 21.90%
rp login 21.25% 25.91% 14.84% 20.91%
rr login 18.00% 24.01% 10.00% 15.21%
pp login 19.27% 24.48% 11.86% 18.63%
pr pwd 22.21% 25.30% 23.21% 27.08%
rp pwd 18.51% 21.56% 26.63% 30.54%
rr pwd 16.95% 19.90% 22.17% 27.00%
pp pwd 16.45% 20.64% 24.02% 29.00%
Mean 19.89% 22.57% 19.65% 23.78%
(p − values are below to 0.05, respectively) the password
information. This result was also attended since the used logins
are much more easier than passwords (hence, users’ way of
typing the imposed logins would be much more stable than
typing the imposed passwords).
A study of the fusion of both information is given in the
next section.
B. Score Fusion
Table III presents the performance of the score fusion when
using different features on the chosen dataset. We can see that
we can improve the performance by fusing the comparison
scores of the right extracted features.
In order to see which feature (or combination of features)
gives the best performance result, we use the KW test over
the seven sets which combine login with password: the EER
values related to the use of “pr”, “rr”, “pp”, “pr” & “rr”, “pr”
& “pp”, “rr” & “pp”, and “pr” & “rr” & “pp” informations,
respectively. We found that the worst result (with p − value
below to 0.05) is obtained by using the “pr” information
(the duration of the press of a key which is the most often
used feature). We have not selected “rp” which is the worst
feature in Table II. The use of all the features (“pr” & “rr”
& “pp”) outperformed (p− values below to 0.05) the use of
“pr” and “pp” informations, while there were no significant
performance difference between all the features and “rr”, “pr”
& “rr”, “pr” & “pp”, “rr” & “pp” informations. We conclude,
that the use of all the features (even if they are redundant) may
improve the performance. This generalizes results obtained on
a single fixed text [1].
C. Study of the performance depending on password size,
entropy and complexity
Using the KW test, we find that the size (p−value = 0.019)
and the entropy (p− value = 0.0062) of the used passwords
have a significant impact on system performance, while there
was no impact (p−value = 0.12) according to the complexity
algorithm. More generally speaking, the average EER value
is increased from 10.03% (for users having more than 8
characters) to 15.85% (for the others). Using the entropy
information, the average EER value is increased from 10.01%
(for those whom the entropy of their passwords is more than
TABLE III
AUTHENTICATION RESULTS, WHEN USING VARIOUS FEATURE FUSION.
THE BEST RESULT OF EACH LINE IS IN BOLD. THE BEST OVERALL RESULT
IS UNDERLINED.
Login Password EERi EERgpr rr pp pr rr pp
Login only
X X 15.99% 22.42%
X X X 14.36% 20.72%
X X 16.57% 23.07%
Password only
X X 14.24% 17.75%
X X X 12.52% 16.74%
X X 15.36% 19.04%
Login and password
X X 18.92% 23.51%
X X 12.37% 15.63%
X X 11.45% 16.15%
X X X X 10.25% 15.85%
X X X X 9.4% 19.96%
X X X X 10.71% 14.95%
X X X X X X 08.87% 14.08%
Mean 13.15% 18.45%
2.7) to 16.09% (for the others). The average method is used
to fix both thresholds (8 and 2.7). It would be important in the
future then to investigate more the way of choosing passwords,
which may be considered as a quality measure in keystroke
dynamics research field. Such quality information would be
useful during the enrollment process in order to enhance the
system overall performance.
V. CONCLUSION
We have presented a new publicly available dataset for
keystroke dynamics. This dataset is composed of several users
who have a different login and password. We think it is the
most realistic keystroke dynamics dataset which is publicly
available. We have statistically verified that: (a) presenting
EER computed with an individual threshold, gives better result
than computing the EER with a global threshold (which
explains why a lot of keystroke dynamics studies use this
method), (b) using logins gives better performance than using
passwords, (c) using all features during the fusion improves
the performance, (d) the size and the entropy of the password
have an impact on the performance.
Keystroke dynamics is an interesting modality, but, it re-
quires strict conditions during acquisition to avoid capture of
noisy samples. This may imply an eduction of the user. As its
performance decreases a lot with time, it is necessary to track
the time variability into account which will be the next work
on this dataset.
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